Exploration Dynamics in Evolutionary Games by Traulsen, Arne et al.
 
Exploration Dynamics in Evolutionary Games
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Traulsen Arne, Christoph Hauert, Hannelore Brandt De Silva,
Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund. 2009. Exploration dynamics
in evolutionary games. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences USA  106(3): 709-712.
Published Version doi:10.1073/pnas.0808450106
Accessed February 18, 2015 10:57:45 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4063698
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAExploration dynamics in evolutionary games
Arne Traulsena,b,1, Christoph Hauertb,c, Hannelore De Silvad, Martin A. Nowakb, and Karl Sigmunde,f
aMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, D-24306 Plo ¨n, Germany; bProgram for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138;
cDepartment of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2; dVienna University of Economics and Business Administration,
A-1090 Vienna, Austria; eFaculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A-1090 Vienna, Austria; and fInternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
Edited by Simon A. Levin, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved November 21, 2008 (received for review August 28, 2008)
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual
success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a
system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful
strategies but sometimes also explore the available strategies at
random. Most research has focused on how strategies spread via
genetic reproduction or cultural imitation, but random exploration
of the available set of strategies has received less attention so far.
In genetic settings, the latter corresponds to mutations in the DNA,
whereas in cultural evolution, it describes individuals experiment-
ing with new behaviors. Genetic mutations typically occur with
very small probabilities, but random exploration of available
strategies in behavioral experiments is common. We term this
phenomenon ‘‘exploration dynamics’’ to contrast it with the tra-
ditional focus on imitation. As an illustrative example of the
emergingevolutionarydynamics,weconsiderapublicgoodsgame
with cooperators and defectors and add punishers and the option
to abstain from the enterprise in further scenarios. For small
mutation rates, cooperation (and punishment) is possible only if
interactions are voluntary, whereas moderate mutation rates can
lead to high levels of cooperation even in compulsory public goods
games. This phenomenon is investigated through numerical sim-
ulations and analytical approximations.
cooperation  costly punishment  ﬁnite populations  mutation rates
E
volutionary game dynamics describes how successful strate-
giesspreadinapopulation(1,2).Individualsreceiveapayoff
from interactions with others. Those strategies that obtain the
highest payoffs have the largest potential to spread in the
population, either by genetic reproduction or by cultural imita-
tion. For example, from time to time, a random focal individual
could compare its payoff with another, randomly chosen role
model. The role model serves as a benchmark for the focal
individual’s own strategy. Depending on the payoff comparison,
the focal individual either sticks to its old strategy or it imitates
the role model’s strategy. We focus here on the simplest choice
for a payoff comparison, which is the following imitation dy-
namics (3): If the role model has a higher payoff, the focal
individual switches to the role model’s strategy. If the role model
has a lower payoff, the focal individual sticks to its own strategy.
If both payoffs are identical, it chooses between the 2 strategies
at random. The imitation dynamics can be obtained from other
dynamics with probabilistic strategy adoption in the limit of
strong selection (4). When only 2 strategies are present, the
dynamics becomes deterministic in following the gradient of
selection. In infinite populations, it leads to deterministic dy-
namics closely related to the classical replicator equation (5, 6).
In both cases, the dynamics remains stochastic if the payoff
differences vanish. For large populations and in the absence of
mutations, the replicator dynamics is a useful framework to
explore the general dynamics of the system. However, because it
does not include any stochastic terms, it is not necessarily a good
approach to describe the dynamics in behavioral experiments. In
finite populations, the system is affected by noise, which can
trigger qualitative changes in the dynamics.
Although imitation dynamics are a common way to model
evolutionary game dynamics, they do not include the possibility
to explore the available strategies. Thus, we allow for random
exploration (or mutations) in addition to the imitation dynamics.
In our model, mutations occur with probability  in each update
step. In genetic settings, mutations change the strategy encoded
in the genome. In such a setting, the mutation probabilities  are
expected to be small. In contrast, according to behavioral
experiments (8, 9), the willingness of humans to explore strategic
options implies much higher mutation rates. In such settings,
people not only imitate others but also act emotionally, attempt
tooutwitothersbyanticipatingtheiractions,orjustexploretheir
strategicoptions(7–9).Asafirstapproximationforasystemwith
few strategies, we subsume the occurrence of such behavior by
a large exploration rate, which leads to the continuous presence
of all strategic types. For example, in compulsory public goods
games without punishment,  20% of the players cooperate (M.
Milinski, personal communication), even though defection is
dominant. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider mutation
rates even greater than 10%.
Thus, 2 limiting cases can be considered: Either random
exploration represents a small disturbance to a pure imitation
process (   1) or imitation is a weak force affecting a purely
randomchoiceprocess(1 1).Thissecondlimitisasimple
way to incorporate effects that cannot be captured by imitation.
For both cases, we present analytical approximations.
Tomakeouranalysismoreconcrete,wefocusontheevolution
of cooperation, which is a fascinating problem across disciplines
such as anthropology, economics, evolutionary biology, and
social sciences (10, 11). In public goods games among N players,
cooperation sustains a public resource. Contributing coopera-
tors pay a cost c to invest in a common good (12, 13). All
contributions are summed up, multiplied by a factor r (1  r 
N) and distributed among all participants, irrespective of
whether they contributed or not. Because only a fraction r/N 
1 of the focal individual’s own investment is recovered by the
investor, it is best to defect and not to contribute. This generates
a social dilemma (14): Individuals that ‘‘free ride’’ on the
contributions of others and do not invest perform best. Such
behavior spreads, and no one invests anymore. Consequently,
theentiregroupsuffers,becauseeveryoneisleftwithzeropayoff
instead of c(r  1) (15). This outcome changes if individuals can
identify and punish defectors. Punishment is costly and means
that one individual imposes a fine on a defecting coplayer (7,
16–21). The establishment of such costly behavior is not trivial
(22, 23): A single punishing cooperator performs poorly in a
population of defectors. Moreover, punishment is not stable
unlesstherearesanctionsalsoonthosewhocooperatebutdonot
punish. Otherwise, such ‘‘second-order free riders’’ can under-
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Smine a population of punishers and pave the way for the return
of defectors. Recently, Fowler (24) has proposed that punish-
ment is easily established if the game is based on voluntary
participation rather than compulsory interactions. However, for
infinite populations and vanishing mutation rates, the dynamics
of the resulting deterministic replicator equations are bistable as
well as structurally unstable (25). Nevertheless, Fowler’s intu-
ition is confirmed for finite populations and small mutation rates
(22). In this case, the initial conditions determine the outcome
of the process.
Methods
Here, we focus on the effect of random exploration and dem-
onstrate that the mutation rate can trigger qualitative changes in
the evolutionary dynamics (26–30). To illustrate how increasing
mutation probabilities affect the evolutionary dynamics, we
address the evolution of cooperation and punishment in N-
player public goods games in finite populations. A group of N
individuals is chosen at random from a finite population of M
individuals. If interactions are not mandatory, individuals can
choose whether they participate in the public goods game (as
cooperators C or defectors D) or refuse to interact (14, 31, 32).
The public goods game represents a risky but potentially worth-
while enterprise. If it fails, nonparticipating loners (L) relying on
a fixed income  are better off. However, if it succeeds,
participation is profitable. Thus, the loner payoff  is larger than
the payoff in a group of defectors but smaller than in a group of
cooperators, 0    (r1)c. Loners affect the average number
of participants S (S  N). Whenever only a single cooperator or
defector joins the game (S  1), he acts as a loner. The
introduction of loners generates a cyclic dominance of strategies:
If cooperators abound, defection spreads. If defectors prevail it
is better to abstain and the average S decreases. For S  r
investments in the public good yield a positive return, and hence,
cooperators thrive again. However, the increase of cooperators
also increases S and thus reestablishes the social dilemma. This
rock–paper–scissors like dynamics has been confirmed in be-
havioral experiments (8). Here, we consider also a fourth
strategic type, the punishers (P) who cooperate and invest but,
in addition, punish the defectors (22, 25). Punishing a defector
costs  and reduces the defector payoff by   . We consider
a generic choice of parameters leading to nontrivial dynamics:
Punishment is less costly to the punisher than to the punished
player,.Furthermore,rN,suchthatdefectiondominates
cooperation. In addition, our analysis makes the weak assump-
tion that a population of only punishers and defectors is bistable,
i.e., punishers cannot invade a defector population, and defec-
tors cannot invade a punisher population. This is a weak
requirement, because otherwise punishment is either trivial (for
vanishingcosts,PdominatesD)orimpossible(ifthecostsexceed
the fines, D dominates P), see supporting information (SI)
Appendix.
Our analytical approach works as follows: First, we calculate
the payoffs of each strategy in one particular interaction with iC
cooperators, iD defectors, iL loners, and iP punishers. Next, we
compute the probability that an interaction group has a certain
composition, i.e., that it includes a particular number of each
type. This determines the average payoffs of the 4 strategies, C,
D, L, and P, which depend on the composition of the
populationX(XC,XD,XL,XP).Detailsofthesecalculationscan
be found in the SI Appendix. The average payoffs form the basis
of the evolutionary dynamics, because they determine the prob-
ability,Tj3k(X),tochooseatypejindividualandtransformitinto
type k. The dynamics of the system in infinite populations has
been discussed before in detail (25, 31, 32). It turns out that if
all 4 strategies are available, the dynamics is bistable as well as
structurally unstable. The system either converges to cycles of
cooperators, defectors and loners, such that no punishers are
present, or to a neutral mixture of cooperators and punishers,
suchthatnolonersanddefectorsarepresent(25).Thus,wefocus
on finite populations and consider 2 different analytical ap-
proaches: (i) For small mutation rates, a mutant goes extinct or
takes over the population before the next mutation occurs. In
thiscase,thedynamicscanbedescribedbyanembeddedMarkov
chain based on the transitions between pure states, where all
players use the same strategy. (ii) For large mutation rates, the
Master equation determining the evolutionary dynamics of the
systemcanbeapproximatedbyaFokker–Planckequation,which
governs the stationary distribution.
For the technical details of these 2 analytical approaches, we
refer to the SI Appendix. Here, we concentrate on the qualitative
features of the resulting dynamics.
Results and Discussion
First, we turn to the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations
for small mutation rates, M2   1 (22, 33). In this case, the time
scales of mutation and imitation are separated. The system is
homogeneous most of the time, i.e., all individuals use the same
strategy, and only occasionally a mutation occurs. The mutant
will either reach fixation or extinction before the next mutant
arises.Thus,wecanrestrictouranalysistoapairwisecomparison
of pure strategies, where all individuals use the same strategy.
The full Markov chain of the system on a large state space can
be approximated by an embedded Markov chain between the
pure states. Interestingly, for imitation dynamics the transition
probabilities—and thus the fixation probabilities—are com-
pletely independent of the interaction parameters (see SI Ap-
pendix). For imitation dynamics, this is a generic result for any
game unless a stable coexistence of at least 2 strategies exist. In
our case, stable fixed points on the edges appear only for
parameters violating our ‘‘generic’’ assumptions. In contrast to
many other types of selection dynamics with weaker selection
(22), only the population size M enters in the transition proba-
bilities. Thus, the stationary distribution only depends on the
population size (see SI Appendix).
In the standard public goods game, defectors naturally dom-
inate cooperators: A defector can take over a cooperator
population, but a cooperator cannot invade a defector popula-
tion.
In public goods games in which cooperators have the option
to punish defectors, the resulting dynamics can be characterized
as follows: In the state with punishers only, no deviant strategy
obtains a higher payoff. However, the situation is not stable, see
Fig. 1A: Cooperators obtain the same payoff and can thus invade
and replace punishers through neutral drift. Once cooperators
have taken over the whole population, defectors are advanta-
geous and take over. Thus, this evolutionary end state is
observed regardless of the availability of the punishment option,
see Fig. 2 A and B: For  3 0, defectors prevail.
In voluntary public goods games without punishment, there is
cyclic dominance. In finite populations, it manifests itself as
follows: When defectors dominate, taking part in the game does
not pay, and the loners that do not participate have the highest
payoff. When there are no participants, a single cooperator does
not have an advantage (because there is no one to play with).
However,assoonasthesecondcooperatorarisesbyneutraldrift
(which happens with probability
1
2), cooperators take over, and
the cycle starts again. Thus, in the long run, the system will spend
50% of the time in the loner state and 25% in the cooperator and
defector states, respectively (see SI Appendix).
If we combine all 4 options, the loner option provides an
escape hatch out of mutual defection: As soon as loners take
over, they pave the way for the recurrent establishment of
cooperation, either with or without punishment (22): In the
vicinity of the loner state L, the dynamics is neutral as long as,
at most, a single participant is present (S  1). A second
710  www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0808450106 Traulsen et al.participant arises by neutral drift with probability
1
2. Both coop-
erators and punishers are advantageous as soon as S  2 and
ultimately take over. If cooperation without punishment is
established, defectors are advantageous and can invade. How-
ever, if punishers take over, it may take a long time before
nonpunishing cooperators take over via neutral drift, because,
on average, M invasion attempts are necessary before fixation
occurs. A detailed analysis of the transition matrix of the system
shows that the system is in state C, D,o rL with probability p 
2/(8  M), see SI Appendix. With the remaining probability 1 
3p  (2  M)/(8  M), the system is in state P. Because
limM3p  0, punishers prevail for large M. Even though the
system spends vanishingly little time in the loner state, they are
pivotal to tip the scale in favor of cooperation (and punishment),
see Fig. 2 (22).
The small mutation rates are fully justified under genetic
reproduction, but this approximation seems to be less appropri-
ate to model cultural evolution or social learning. For high
A
Punishers
Cooperators Defectors
μ=0.0
B
Punishers
Cooperators Defectors
μ=0.18
C
Punishers
Cooperators Defectors
μ=0.5
Fig. 1. Dynamics of the system with cooperators, defectors and punishers in
the simplex S3 for different mutation rates. The arrows show the drift term
Ak(x)oftheFokker–Planckequation,whitecirclesarestableﬁxedpointsinthe
limit M 3 . The discontinuities are a consequence of the strong selection.
Blue corresponds to fast dynamics and red to slow dynamics close to the ﬁxed
pointsofthesystem.Thesystemdoestypicallynotaccessthegrayshadedarea,
because the minimum average fraction of each type because of mutations is
/3. (A) For vanishing mutation probability ( 3 0), there is only 1 stable ﬁxed
pointinthedefectorcorner.(B)For0.2,thereare2stableﬁxedpoints,one
close to the cooperator corner and one close to the defector corner. The
population noise can drive the system from the vicinity of one of these points
to the other, which makes an analytical description of the dynamics difﬁcult.
(C) For   0.5, there is only a single stable ﬁxed point, which is closest to the
cooperatorcorner—thus,cooperatorsprevailforhighmutationrates.Weuse
the position of this ﬁxed point as an estimate for the average abundance of
the strategies, see Fig. 2 [parameters: M  100, N  5, r  3, c  1;   1,  
0.3;   1, graphical output based on the Dynamo software (37)].
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Fig. 2. Imitation dynamics for different mutation rates. Symbols indicate
results from individual-based simulations (averages over 109 imitation steps),
and solid lines show the numerical solution of the Fokker–Planck-equation,
corresponding to a vanishing drift term Ak(x), see SI Appendix. Because a
fraction  of the population always mutates, the minimum fraction of each
type is /d (for d strategies) and the gray shaded areas are inaccessible to the
process.Althoughpreviousapproacheshavefocusedonsmallmutationrates,
large mutation rates change the outcome signiﬁcantly. (A) In compulsory
public goods interactions, defectors dominate cooperators for all mutation
rates. (B) In compulsory public goods interactions with punishment, defectors
only dominate for small . For high mutation (or exploration) rates , coop-
erators dominate, see Fig. 1 for details. Despite their small abundance, pun-
ishers are pivotal for the large payoff and high abundance of cooperators for
  0.2. (C) In voluntary public goods games, cooperators dominate for high
mutation rates as well. Although this effect does not depend on the presence
of loners, these are essential for the success of punishers for small mutations.
The horizontal lines for small , to which the symbols converge for  3 0, is
thestationarysolutionoftheMarkovchain,seeSIAppendix(parameters:M
100, N  5, r  3, c  1;   1,   0.3;   1).
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Smutation rates, the previous analytical approximation fails,
because the time scales between imitation and mutation are no
longer separated. For high mutation or exploration probabilities
and large populations, M   1, all strategies are always present
in the population. Thus, mutations generate a fixed background
of all strategic types. Additionally, the dynamics is also affected
by noise arising from the finite population size M. To describe
the system analytically, we can approximate the underlying
master equation of the system by a Fokker–Planck equation. The
drift term captures the deterministic part of the dynamics. The
diffusion term takes stochastic fluctuations into account that
arise from the finite population size M. For  3 1, there is no
imitation, and the only equilibrium is equal abundance of all
strategies. For smaller , several stable equilibria may exist, but
the stochastic noise preferentially leads to the equilibrium with
the largest basin of attraction. This approach works best for large
M, because in this case, the noise is too weak for the system to
switch repeatedly between equilibria. In addition, we need large
, such that only 1 or very few equilibria exist. For M 3  and
 3 0, this approach essentially recovers the replicator equation
again (34, 35).
The continuous presence of all strategic types for large  is
reflected by a drift away from the boundaries of the simplex, see
Fig. 1. If only cooperators and defectors are present, this leads
to a nonvanishing fraction of the dominated cooperators, see
Fig. 2A. If also the punishment option is available, large 
implies that defectors are always punished and cannot take over,
whereas punishers suffer from the persistent need to sanction
defectors. Consequentially, cooperators perform best, because
they can rely on the punishers to decrease the payoff of
defectors, see Figs. 1 and 2B. In agreement with behavioral
experiments (36), punishers bear the costs of punishment and do
not win. Nonetheless, the punishment option is often chosen (21,
36). The option to abstain has no qualitative influence for large
 and barely changes the outcome, see Fig. 2C. The pivotal role
of loners to promote cooperation for small  falls to punishers
for large : Even though the average fraction of punishers is
barely higher than that of defectors, punishers are responsible
for the success of cooperators. Thus, large exploration rates can
lead to a significant increase of cooperation.
To summarize, we have shown that for rare mutations, the
imitation dynamics in a finite population of size M becomes
independent of the parameters r, N, , , and , because the
fixation probabilities depend only on the ranking of payoffs and
not on their detailed values. For rare mutation rates, the average
abundance of the strategy is entirely governed by the fixation
probabilities. Interaction parameters are relevant only when the
mutation rate  increases. Most importantly, however, the
magnitude of  can have crucial effects on the qualitative
features of the dynamics. For low mutation probabilities coop-
eration (and punishment) gets established only in voluntary
public goods interactions. If participation is compulsory, coop-
eration is not feasible at all, even with punishment. In contrast,
high mutation or exploration probabilities lead to the prevalence
of cooperators irrespective of whether individuals have the
option to abstain from the public enterprise. Thus, large explo-
ration rates can lead to a significant increase of cooperation.
In evolutionary game theory, it is common practice to assume
small mutation rates. This is, of course, justified by the small
probabilities of genetic mutations. However, when turning to
imitation dynamics, social learning or cultural evolution, explo-
ration probabilities may be high and may turn into an important
and decisive factor for the evolutionary fate of the system.
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1 Payoffs
First, we calculate the average payoffs for the public goods game with all four strategic types. From this, it is straight-
forward to infer the payoffs if some of the strategies are absent. In one particular interaction with iC cooperators, iD
defectors, iL loners, and iP punishers, we have S = iC + iP + iD participants. For S  1 no interaction takes place
and everybody receives the loners payoff . For S > 1, the four different types obtain the payoffs
PC = rc
iC + iP
S
  c;
PD = rc
iC + iP
S
  iP;
PL = ;
PP = rc
iC + iP
S
  c   iD:
(1)
The average payoffs k of the four strategies can be calculated from the average group composition. In a population
with XC cooperators, XD defectors, XL loners, and XP punishers (XC+XD+XL+XP = M), a randomly sampled
group of size N has a particular composition with probability given by the multivariate hypergeometric distribution,
H(i;X) =
 XC
iC
 XD
iD
 XL
iL
 XP
iP

 M
N
 : (2)
Here, i = (iC;iD;iL;iP) and X = (XC;XD;XL;XP). The average group composition determines the average
payoffs k =
P
iC
P
iD
P
iL
P
iP H(:::)Pk, which simplify to
C = B(X)   F(XL)c (3)
D = B(X)  
XP
M   1
(N   1) (4)
L =  (5)
P = B(X)   F(XL)c  
XD
M   1
(N   1): (6)
The quantity B(X) (the return of the public goods game or  in the case of only one participant) is given by
B(X) =
rc(XC + XP)
M   XL   1

1  
M
N(M   XL)

(7)
+
  XL
N 1

 M 1
N 1


 +
rc(XC + XP)(XL   N + 1)
N(M   XL   1)(M   XL)

:
The effective cost to contribute to the public good is
F(XL) = 1  
r
N
M   N
M   XL   1
(8)
+
  XL
N 1

 M 1
N 1


r
N
XL + 1
M   XL   1
+ r
M   XL   2
M   XL   1
  1

:
1The relevant payoffs for the replicator equation are obtained in the limit M ! 1 or from an equivalent calculation
assuming inﬁnite M from the beginning [1].
As mentioned in the main text, to avoid that punishment trivially succeeds (if D is dominated by P) or trivially fails
(if P is dominated by D), the pairwise comparison of the punisher and defector strategy requires bistability. In other
words, a single punisher cannot invade a population of defectors and, conversely, a single defector cannot invade a
population of punishers. This is satisﬁed if a single punisher has a smaller payoff than the resident defectors:
c
 r
N
  1

  (N   1) <
N   1
M   1
rc
N
  

: (9)
For  < (M   1) this always holds. This is a weak condition and gets violated only if punishment becomes very
cheap. Conversely, a single defector has a smaller payoff than the resident punishers if
(N   1) >
N   1
M   1
 + c

1  
r
N
M   N
M   1

: (10)
For large populations (M  N), this reduces to (N   1) > c(1  
r
N ). In particular, if the punishment exceeds the
maximal costs of cooperation this always holds.
2 Evolutionary dynamics
Here, the two different analytical approximations for the evolutionary dynamics in the limits of small and high mutation
or exploration rates are discussed in detail.
2.1 Small mutation rates
In ﬁnite populations with small mutation rates [2, 3], the population is homogeneous most of the time. Occasionally
a mutation occurs with probability  and an individual switches to a different random strategy. The mutant either
reaches ﬁxation or extinction before the next mutant arises. The average time until a neutral mutant reaches ﬁxation
is M(M   1) time steps [4]. The average time between two mutations is 
 1. Thus, for   M
 2, the time scales
of mutation and imitation are separated and we only have to consider two strategies at a time. The probability of
ﬁxation can be calculated analytical for any birth death process [5], but becomes particularly simple in our case of
strong selection: 0, 1, or
1
M (for neutral transitions).
If only cooperators and defectors are present, the probability that a single cooperator takes over a defector population
is zero for strong selection. A single defector, however, always takes over a cooperator population. This leads to the
following transition matrix between the
 
C D
C 1    
D 0 1
!
: (11)
The ﬁrst line determines the probability that the population remains in the C state or ends up in the D state after a
mutation. With probability 1   , no mutation occurs and the population remains in C. With probability , a mutation
leads to a D individual, which takes over and brings the system to the D state. Mutations in the D state can produce
C individuals, but they cannot take over. Therefore, the probability to move from D to C is zero. The stationary
distribution is given by the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue 1, which is (xC;xD) = (0;1). Thus, the
system stays in the D state.
For public goods games with punishment, we obtain the transition matrix
0
B
@
C D P
C 1  

2  

M

2

2M
D 0 1 0
P

2M 0 1  

2M
1
C
A: (12)
Let us discuss the ﬁrst line again, i.e. the population is in the C state: If a mutation occurs, the mutant is a punisher
with probability
1
2 and takes over the population with probability
1
M . This leads to the entry in the last line,

2M . With
2probability
1
2, the mutant is a defector, which always takes over the population. Thus, the probability to go from the
cooperator state to the defector state is

2. The probability to go from C to C follows from normalization of the ﬁrst line.
The transition probabilities in the remaining lines follow equivalently. The eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue
1 is (xC;xD;xP) = (0;1;0). Thus, the system again always remains in the defector state.
For voluntary public goods games, i.e. with loners instead of punishers, the transition matrix reads
0
B
@
C D L
C 1  

2

2 0
D 0 1  

2

2
L

4 0 1  

4
1
C
A: (13)
Let us discuss the ﬁrst entry in the last line. The probability to go from the loner state to the cooperator state is

4,
because such a mutation occurs with probability

2 and the mutant takes over with probability
1
2. The remaining entries
follow analogous reasoning as above. The stationary distribution yields (xC;xD;xL) = (
1
4;
1
4;
1
2).
The transition matrix for all four strategies is
0
B
B
B
@
C D L P
C 1  

3  

3M

3 0

3M
D 0 1  

3

3 0
L

6 0 1  

3

6
P

3M 0 0 1  

3M
1
C
C
C
A
: (14)
We obtain the stationary distribution from the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue 1 of the stochastic transition
matrix, (xC;xD;xL;xP) =
1
8+M (2;2;2;2 + M). For large populations, punishers prevail, (xC;xD;xL;xP) !
(0;0;0;1). Even though the system spends a negligible amount of time in the loner state, they are pivotal in order to
tip the scale in favor of cooperation (and punishment) [2]. This follows directly from the comparison with the C, D, P
case.
3 High mutation rates
We state the procedure for the general case of d strategies here. From the payoffs  of the strategies, we derive the
transition probabilities for the imitation process. The probability to choose an individual of type j and transform it into
type k either through imitation or mutation is
Tj!k(X) =
Xj
M

(1   )
Xk
M
[k   j] +

d   1

: (15)
Here, j;k = C;D;L;P and [x] denotes the Heavyside function. The equation can be rationalized as follows: With
probability
Xj
M , an individual of type j is selected as focal individual. With probability 1   , no mutation occurs. The
role model is of type k with probability
Xk
M . Switching to the role model’s strategy occurs only for k > j. With
probability , a mutation occurs and the focal individual switches to one of the d   1 alternative strategies with equal
probability. Thus, the probability to adopt strategy k is
1
d 1.
The Master equation governing the dynamics of the probability 

t(X) that the system is in state X is given by


t+1(X) = 

t(X)   T
out(X)

t(X) + T
in(X + )

t(X + ); (16)
where T
out(X) =
P
j;k;j6=k Tj!k(X) summarizes the transition probabilities leading away from X. Similarly, the
transitions from neighboring states X +  into X are symbolized by T
in(X + ). Equivalently to T
out(X), also
T
in(X) involves a sum, but here the sum is over the neighboring states, which makes the notation more complex.
Details can be found in [6]. Employing a Kramers-Moyal expansion of the Master equation for large system size M,
we can derive a Fokker-Planck equation for the probability density (x) [6, 7, 8],
_ (x) =  
X
k
@
@xk
(x)Ak(x) +
1
2
X
j;k
@
2
@xk@xj
(x)Bjk(x) (17)
3where xk = Xk=M. The drift vector describing the deterministic part of the dynamics is given by
Ak(x) =
X
j
(Tj!k   Tk!j) (18)
and the diffusion matrix characterizing the noise by
Bjk(x) =
1
M
[ (Tj!k + Tk!j) + jk
X
l
(Tj!l + Tl!j)]: (19)
The noise scales with M
 1 and determines the variances of the distribution for large M. Note that the game has no
impact on the diffusion term because Tj!l +Tl!j = (1 )xjxl +(xj +xl)=(d 1). Moreover, mutations affect
the properties of the noise, but Bjk(x) neither vanishes for  = 0 nor for  = 1.
The stationary probability distribution has maxima close to the points with Ak(x) = 0. These points are computed
numerically. Several such points may appear when decreasing , but the noise typically selects one of them. For
numerical procedures, we approximate the Heavyside-function [x] by the Fermi function F(x) =
h
1 + e
 x=T
i 1
,
where T  1.
In the case of two strategies, e.g. cooperators and defectors, the drift term is particularly simple and reduces to
AC(x) = TD!C(x)   TC!D(x). The solution of AC(x) = 0 reads in this special case
xC =
1 +   
p
1   2 + 52
2   2
: (20)
For the general case with d > 2, AC(x) = 0 can only be solved numerically.
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